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Articles
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS: THE PHILADELPHIA STORY
PAUL NEJELSKI*
AND
ANDREW S. ZELDIN**
Our justice system's problems-primarily delay, expense, and
overburdened courts-have received increased public attention re-
cently, in large part because of public comments by the Justices of the
Supreme Court.' It has become a truism that we are the most litiguous
people on earth, and that our machinery for processing all this litiga-
tion is sorely over-taxed. If we cannot learn to live together more har-
moniously, we must find a means to disagree more efficiently.
Students of court reform know that these problems are not new,
and that a number of solutions have been proposed for many years-
some since the beginning of recorded time. One such proposal is the
development of alternative dispute-resolution methods, and a promis-
ing example is the "court-annexed"2 arbitration program currently un-
derway since 1978 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania3 and the
* Circuit Executive for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Phi-
la.); Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office for Improvements in
the Administration of Justice 1977-79; B.A. 1959, Yale College; LL.B. 1962, Yale Law
School; M.P.A. 1969, American University. Lecturer, University of Maryland School of
Law.
** Staff Attorney, New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts (Trenton); B.A. 1978,
M.A. 1980, University of Akron; J.D. 1983, Villanova University. This article was prepared
while serving as a Research Intern at the Office of the Third Circuit Executive.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors. This article was not written
in their respective capacities as Circuit Executive and Research Intern and does not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the Circuit Executive's Office.
1. See, e.g., Remarks of Chief Justice Warren Burger at the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Din-
ner (Nov. 18, 1982) (available at the offices of the Maryland Law Review or the Federal
Judicial Center Information Service); Powell, Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucra-
cies?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 275-76 (1982).
2. The term "court-annexed arbitration" apparently was conceived by Assistant Attor-
ney General Daniel J. Meador. See The Court-AnnexedArbitration Act of 1978. Hearings on
S. 2253 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1978) (statement of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3. To initiate the court-annexed arbitration program, Local Rule 49 was adopted on
February 1, 1978, for a period of one year on an experimental basis. After an extension of
the temporary rule, "[on August 1, 1980 the [arbitration] program was extended indefinitely
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Northern District of California (a program begun in the District of
Connecticut has since been discontinued). Court-annexed arbitration
differs from other kinds of arbitration4 in that: it is compulsory for
cases meeting the program's eligibility requirements; parties are enti-
tled to a trial de novo in the district court; and perhaps most important,
the entire program is conducted under the supervision of the district
court.5 Adopted by local rule in the district courts, the arbitration pro-
gram seeks to improve access to justice for litigants in civil actions by
reducing the time and expense required to resolve their disputes.6 In
addition, the program may ease the caseload of both the District Court
and Circuit Court of Appeals by reducing the number of civil trials,
and therefore the number of appeals.7
After a brief historical review of court-annexed arbitration, this
with the adoption of Local Civil Rule 8." See M. KUNZ, ARBITRATION SUMMARY, FEB. 1,
1978 - Jan. 31, 1983, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983].
4. Four federal district courts provide for voluntary arbitration in their local rules. See
D. HAWAII R. Civ. P. 235.3f; N.D. ILL. R. Civ. P. 24; D. MD. R. Civ. P. 38A; W.D. WASH. R.
Civ. P. 39.1.
In Hawaii, Local Rule 235.3f went into effect on October 1, 1981. At a status confer-
ence attended by the parties prior to trial, the arbitration procedure may be ordered by a
judge after an action has been filed. The procedure is very rarely used. Telephone interview
with Clerk's Office, District of Hawaii (Aug. Ii, 1982).
In Illinois and Maryland, the parties to a civil action may stipulate, subject to the
approval of the court, in writing for submission of the controversy, or particular issues
therein, to arbitration. See N.D. ILL. R. Civ. P. 24; D. MD. R. Civ. P. 38A. In Illinois the
rule is used minimally, if at all. Telephone interview with Perry Moses, Chief Deputy Clerk
of the Northern District of Illinois (Jan. 13, 1983). The arbitration rule in Maryland has
never been used. Telephone interview with Paul Schlitz, Clerk of Court for the District of
Maryland (Jan. 13, 1983).
In Washington the local rule provides that parties to a dispute may stipulate to arbi-
tration. See W.D. WASH. R. Civ. P. 39.1. It is being used successfully, but by only one
judge. Telephone interview with Joseph Haas, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Western District
of Washington (Jan. 13, 1983).
One commentator has noted that voluntary arbitration programs have not been as
successful as compulsory programs. Because of the resistance of the Bar to innovation and
the possible resistance of litigants to using unfamiliar procedures to settle their disputes,
voluntary arbitration programs are not used with sufficient frequency to create an impact on
court dockets. See Note, Compulsory Judicial Arbitration in California: Reducing the Delay
and Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 492, 506-07
(1978).
5. See Note, supra note 4, at 48 1-83. For a comparative analysis of traditional litiga-
tion and traditional (non-court-annexed) arbitration in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
see H. KRITZER & J. ANDERSON, THE ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF CASE PROCESSING TIME, DISPOSITION MODE, AND COST IN THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND THE COURTspassim (1983) (Available at Disputes Process-
ing Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School).
6. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 21 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
7. See id. at 20 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
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article examines the factors that led to the implementations of the pro-
gram, describes the characteristics of the program, and evaluates its
success, after five years, in meeting the goals for which it was created.
This Article concludes by urging that Congress and the federal judici-
ary expand the program.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. General Background
As today's justice system struggles to meet the ever-increasing de-
mands of modem society's complexity, it seems logical to seek innova-
tive alternatives to the problems of expense and delay which that
complexity produces. Consequently, a risk arises that an alternative
will be characterized as novel simply because it mitigates modem
problems. In the case of arbitration, however, such a characterization
would be inaccurate. The concept of arbitration may be traced back to
ancient Egyptian8 and Greek societies,9 and is therefore among the old-
est methods of dispute resolution.
Arbitration's popularity has waxed and waned in response to dif-
ferent forces at various periods in Anglo-American legal history. In
England, arbitration has been practiced at least since the medieval pe-
riod as merchants-often foreigners and residents for a short time-
needed quick, impartial, and expert resolution of their disputes.' ° Ar-
8. See Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 182, 184 (1965). "[I]n Egypt... circa 2500 B.C., the grand chief Nekheb dictated that
controversies between the priests [were to] be submitted to fellow members of the college for
settlement." Id. (citing Mantica, Arbitration in Ancient Egypt, 12 ARB. J. 155, 158 (1957)).
9. See D.M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS, 203-11 (1978). Arbitra-
tion apparently developed in Athens as an alternative to the expensive and elaborate proce-
dures that characterized its administration of justice. Id. at 203. Initially, arbitration was a
private agreement by which the parties consented to be bound by the award of the arbitra-
tor. Id. at 204-06. Public arbitration, as distinguished from private arbitration, also existed
in Athens. Unlike private arbitration, either party to public arbitration could appeal the
arbitrator's award and retain the right to jury trial. The parties in private arbitration chose
their arbitrator, but in public arbitration "they were compelled by law to submit their case to
an arbitrator who was not of their own choosing." Id. at 209.
10. See Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 276 (1982).
[A] study of. . . commercial arbitration indicates that it is not a recent phenomenon.
Mercantile disputes have been decided. . . in the Anglo-American world since at least
the thirteenth century. In the early period the decision[s] of mercantile cases [were]
assigned to courts staffed by merchants...; the guilds and trading companies had their
own tribunals . . . . Chancery referred its mercantile cases to arbitration, while the
common law courts seemed to be using merchant juries.
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-55 (1961).
For an analysis of the adoption of commercial arbitration in English law see Sayre,
Development of CommercialArbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928). Sayre suggests that
commercial arbitration developed as "part of the regular judicial system" employed and
19831
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bitration's low cost, flexibility, and informality, together with the famil-
iarity of many arbitrators with commercial issues," enabled business
arbitration to thrive throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries even as the common law underwent reform.' 2 One major problem
that developed during the seventeenth century, however, was the in-
ability of a party to enforce the arbitration award.' 3 This drawback,
some scholars argue, was responsible for arbitration's ultimate demise
in England.' 4 Although arbitration survived in form under statutory
authority, it became subject to the stultifying effect of increasingly close
supervision and intervention by the courts.'5
Although scholars disagree about the extent of its use, arbitration
was practiced in America as early as the colonial period.' 6 By the late
developed by the courts. Id. at 598. The earliest English case involving arbitration is stated
to have occurred during the consolidation of the English Kingdom, after the Anglo-Saxon
period. Id. at 597-98. But see Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman
Periods, 16 ARB. J. 193passim (1961) (arbitration existed during Anglo-Saxon period).
11. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 145 (1977). The agri-
cultural bent of the courts resulted in "mercantile questions [being] so ignorantly treated
when they came into Westminster Hall, that they were usually settled by private arbitration
among the merchants themselves." Id. at 147 (quoting Lord Campbell). When a group of
merchants established a system of arbitration in their town, it was noted that "in addition to
the fact that legal decisions 'were often grievously expensive,' they were 'frequently different
from what sea-faring persons conceived to be just' because of 'the ignorance of lawyers in
maritime affairs ....... Id.
12. See Address by H. Arthurs, Public Lecture to Faculty of Law, University of Sas-
katchewan (Mar. 26, 1982) (on file with the Maryland Law Review) noting that "by the
middle of the nineteenth century, even as the formal legal system struggled to rationalize
and reform itself, arbitration of business disputes [in England] was becoming particularly
widespread." 1d. at 8.
13. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 145 (citing Vynior's Case (1609) 4 Coke's Rep. pt.
8, 81a & 81b (K.B. 1609)).
14. See Boskey, A History of CommercialArbitration in New Jersey, 8 RUT.-CAM L.J. 1
(1976). "[The English] courts... refused to recognize the validity of an agreement to arbi-
trate and were prepared to substitute their judgment for that of an arbitrator at any point
prior to execution of the award." Id. at 2 (citation omitted). But see H. Arthurs, supra note
12, at 7-11 (courts review of award followed enactment of Arbitration Act in 1899).
15. See H. Arthurs, supra note 12, at 10. Arthurs argues that the one serious weakness
of arbitration was that a party could withdraw his consent to arbitration. The enactment of
the Arbitration Act of 1899 allowed courts "to extend to arbitrators full legal support for
their procedures and decisions but also, . . . they acquired an open-ended mandate to re-
view arbitrators' decisions." Id. Another author traces the beginning of the process ofjudi-
cial interest in scrutiny and review of arbitration to the First Arbitration Act in England in
1698. See M. Horwitz, supra note 1I, at 145. This development followed the breakdown of
the self-policing mechanism of penalties which, before 1697, had been used to enforce arbi-
tration awards. Id.
16. See, e.g., M. Horwitz, supra note i, at 145. "In America, use of extra-judicial
means of settlement through arbitration and reference was very widespread among commer-
cial interests during the colonial period but remained essentially unregulated by courts." Id.
But see F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 4-6 (1948). "Except for its adoption by a few
trade and commercial organizations and its use in the settlement of some differences over
[VOL. 42
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eighteenth century, arbitration had become a popular alternative
among merchants for largely the same reasons-particularly the com-
mercial expertise arbitration brought to bear on disputes-that had at-
tracted merchants of an earlier period in England. 7 By the end of the
eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, however, arbitration in
America began to decline. 8 Although several theories have been ad-
vanced to account for this decline,' 9 it is clear that, paralleling the ear-
lier developments across the Atlantic,2" arbitration's efficacy was
severely eroded by restrictions imposed by a judiciary and bar hostile
to extrajudicial settlement. This pattern emerged against the backdrop
of the larger ideological struggle between the Hamiltonians and the Jef-
fersonians that shaped the organization and power of the judicial
colonial rights and boundaries and in the collection of debts, arbitration does not appear to
have struck deep roots in early American life." Id. at 6.
17. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 146-48.
18. This decline occurred despite the "great legislative advance in encouraging extra-
judicial dispute resolution." Id. at 149.
19. One scholar notes that the decline occurred due to the indiscriminate application of
the term "arbitration" to other processes, e.g., mediation and conciliation, which caused
parties to become confused and disenchanted. Often, would-be litigants expected a judicial
process, but instead were prodded to compromise. Therefore, general misunderstandings
and dissatisfaction with arbitration developed. F. KELLOR, supra note 16, at 5. This theory
suggests that as the common law and court machinery developed, the arbitration process
was "caught" in a "period of confusion," and without the benefit of its own machinery, it
was eclipsed by the former. As a result, the arbitration process fell into disuse. Id. at 5-6.
Another commentator contends that "[tihe need of the English courts to be self-
supporting led them to develop a hostility towards alternative forums for the resolution of
disputes, and arbitration, with its advantages of speed and economy, posed a serious threat
to their jurisdiction. These courts, therefore, refused to recognize the validity of an agree-
ment to arbitrate and were prepared to substitute their judgment for that of an arbitrator at
any point prior to execution of the award." Boskey, supra note 14, at 2 (citations omitted).
Another commentator, in perhaps a more logical explanation, attributes the demise
to sound judicial interpretation. He asserts that had the courts wished to secure the jurisdic-
tion of all disputes for themselves they would have "ruled that a bond given to secure a
submission to arbitration was against public policy, and void." Sayre, supra note 10, at 610.
Instead these courts "have based their attitude solely on the interpretation of common law
rights, holding that one could not contract away his right to revoke where the provision for
settling the dispute by arbitration did not have the sanctions of due notice and fair hearing."
Id.
For an analysis of the "doctrine of judicial jealousy" see Kulukundis Shipping Co.,
S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942). For a discussion of the
origin of this theory see J. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW, 153-69
(1918). For a discussion of the alternative, judicial protection - common law approach, see
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1312, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065); Sayre,
supra note 10, at 610-12.
20. See M. HORWITZ, supra note i1, at 154. Horwitz notes that the increased organiza-
tion and self-consciousness of the legal profession, coupled with its developing accommoda-
tion of the merchants' interests through the transformation of the legal rules, produced a law
that was capable of being the "one disputed and authoritative source of rules for regulating
commercial ife." Id. at 154-55.
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branch during its formative years.2 ' The Hamiltonians, concerned with
stability and precedent, generally prevailed over the Jeffersonian inter-
est in equity, individually tailored justice, and alternative means of dis-
pute resolution.22
One author has observed that Americans traditionally have been
more inclined to settle their disputes by force or its close substitute-
litigation-than by arbitration.23 Consequently, with judicial remedies
firmly established as the means for dispute resolution, little effort was
made to promote arbitration throughout the nineteenth century. 24 It
was not until after the first World War, when arbitration agreements
were held legally valid and enforceable,25 that a new era in American
arbitration began.26
21. See Nejelski, The Jeffersonian/Hamilonian Duality. A Frameworkfor Understanding
Reforms in the Administration ofJustice, 64 JUDICATURE 450, 452 (1981). "[The mercantile
classes, which had found the colonial legal rules hostile to their interests began, at the end of
the eighteenth century, to find that common law judges themselves were prepared to over-
turn anticommercial legal conceptions." M. HORWITZ, supra note 1I, at 154. The commer-
cial areas of New England and New York were Federalist (Hamiltonian) strongholds,
favoring a strong national commercial economy and opposing alternatives to the court (i.e.
arbitration). They feared that such innovations would create uncertainty with respect to the
national economic system and thereby threaten their positions as creditors. See Nejelski,
supra, at 452. The Jeffersonians, popular in the South and West, advocated a decentralized
government and were unsupportive of a strong, elitist judiciary. Id. at 452-53. One thinker
went even further. "[A] radical writing in 1786 ... proposed the abolition of lawyers and,
as a partial alternative, an extensive system of arbitration." Id. at 453 n. 9 (citing R. ELLIS,
THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 114 (1971).
22. Nejelski, supra note 21, at 453-59. The Constitution reflects a compromise between
the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian positions with respect to the checks and balances system
and the right to a jury trial. Id. at 452-53. However, alternatives to the courts were not
generally accepted. For example, arbitration awards were "opposed by the judiciary, which
refused to give [the awards] binding [effect]." Id. at 459 (citing W. STURGES, CASES ON
ARBITRATION LAW (1953)). Also, administrative agencies and decisions were resisted by the
judicial system. See Nejelski, supra note 21, at 459.
23. See F. KELLOR, supra note 16, at 6-7. "America was a rich country, full of adven-
ture and could afford a considerable volume of disputes at a high cost of settlement ....
Since in trade and commerce the margin of profit was then sufficient to allow for a very
considerable waste, the attribute of economy was not an attraction to arbitration." 1d. at 6.
24. Id. at 5. "Education in the knowledge or use of arbitration was unheard of, nor was
there source material available, nor had teachers thought of instruction in the subject ....
Generally speaking, unawareness was the phenomenon of this early period." Id. at 8.
25. Sarpy, supra note 8, at 184. Although agreements to arbitrate were not illegal,
before the 1920's parties generally could not compel performance of them. Id. Legislation,
enacted in New York in 1920, authorized courts to validate agreements to submit disputes to
arbitration. 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275 § 2. The Supreme Court, in upholding this statute,
required that a court action must be stayed upon a showing that a valid contract provision
mandates that the parties arbitrate their dispute. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924). Subsequently, Congress enacted arbitration statutes. See, e.g.,
Railway Labor Act ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164
(1964)). See generally Sarpy, supra note 8, at 184-85.
26. F. KELLOR, supra note 16, at 9.
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B. Pennsylvania's Heritage
Pennsylvania's experience with arbitration has been longer and
richer than most parts of the country.27  "Under the influence of
Quaker antilegalism, Pennsylvania had been at the forefront of the col-
onies in providing for arbitration."28 Pennsylvania adopted its first ju-
dicial arbitration statute in 1705,29 enabling litigants by mutual consent
to submit voluntarily to arbitration.3" In 1810 a new Act3" provided for
compulsory arbitration upon the official request of one of the liti-
gants.32 The Act of 183633 incorporated the provisions of the prior acts
and retained the Pennsylvania common law dealing with arbitration.34
The procedure, however, was not widely used because of the inade-
quate compensation the arbitrators received.35 The next major devel-
opment came in 1951, when the legislature amended the 1836 statute to
authorize the Common Pleas Courts to enact, by rule of court, a com-
27. See F. KELLOR, supra note 16, at 7. In addition to commercial arbitration, Penn-
sylvania has also had a long history of court-annexed arbitration. See infra notes 28-44 and
accompanying text.
28. M. HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 151.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8 (Purdon 1963) (originally enacted as 1705, I Sm. L. 49,
§ 3). In 1976, Pennsylvania began to recodify its laws. As a result, title 5, section 8 has been
repealed, amended and recodified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7362 (Purdon 1982).
30. The Act provided that the parties mutually choose the arbitration panel. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7362 (Purdon 1982) (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8 (Purdon 1963). The
standard of review for setting aside an arbitration award included "case[s] in which it ap-
pear[ed] that the principles whereon the award [was] founded [were] contrary to law."
O'Reilly v. Reading, 3 Berks 410 (1911). The standard of review for an arbitrator's mistake
of fact was that "the mistake must be plain, manifest, [and] unquestionable .... It must
appear that there was no evidence sufficient to sustain the facts declared by the award." Id.
at 411.
31. Act of March 20, 1810 cited in Comment, Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania-
It's Scope, Effect, Application, and Limitations in Montgomery and Delaware Counties-A
Survey andAnalysis, 2 VILL. L. REV. 529, 531 (1957).
32. See Comment, supra note 31, at 531.
33. Act of June 16, 1836, 1836 Pa. Laws 715 (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7301 et seq. (Purdon 1982)).
34. See Historical Note, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1 (Purdon 1963). "The act of 1836...
was intended to supply and to incorporate all the provisions of the acts of 1705, . . . 1806,
. ..1808,. . . 1809,. . . 1810,. . . 1813,. . . 1820,. . . 1824,. . . 1825 .... " Id. Some
question existed subsequent to the enactment of the Act of 1836 as to whether it incorpo-
rated the Act of 1806, thereby repealing it. This question was affirmatively resolved "in 1868
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Steel v. Lineberger, 59 Pa. 308 (1868)." Comment,
supra note 31, at 531 n.12.
35. Note, Compulsory Arbitration to Relieve Trial Calendar Congestion, 8 STAN. L. REV.
410, 411 n. 8 (1956) citing Brandon & Marinaro, Butler County Tries Arbitration, 23 PA.
B.A.Q. 58 (1951). See Elsbree, The Case For More Arbitration, 30 PA. B.A.Q. 335, 339 n.4
(1959) (stating that the arbitration proceeding was a complicated one and that, because the
arbitrators were not required to be members of the Bar, the level of their competence often
was less than professional).
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pulsory arbitration program for all cases with an amount in contro-
versy below $1,000.36
On the whole, the results of Pennsylvania's state program have
been encouraging. The arbitration statute, which has been amended to
increase the jurisdictional amount several times since 195 1, has with-
stood constitutional challenges.3" The program has expedited case set-
36. Act of June 14, 1952, 1951 Pa. Laws 590 (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7361(b)(2) (Purdon 1982) (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Purdon 1963)). The Act provided in
pertinent part:
The several courts of common pleas, the County Court of Allegheny County
and the Municipal Court of Philadelphia may, by rules of court, provide that all cases
which are at issue where the amount in controversy shall be $1,000 or less, except those
involving title to real estate, shall first be submitted to and heard by a board of three (3)
members of the bar within the judicial district.
1951 Pa. Laws 590 § 8.1.
37. The statute was amended in 1957 and 1959. See Historical Note, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 30 (Purdon 1963). The award limit was increased to $2,000 in 1958, $3,000 in 1968, and
to $10,000 in 1971. See Note, supra note 4, at 483 n.45 (1978) (citing COMPILED MATERIALS
IN THE PHILADELPHIA COMPULSORY ARBITRATION PROGRAM 2-3 (Apr. I, 1973)). See also
Terrill, Arbitration Center Cuts Court Backlog, Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, (The Re-
tainer Supplement), May 26, 1982, at 15, col. 2.
In September 1971, the Board of Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Phil-
adelphia County raised the arbitration limit to $10,000 following the passage of en-
abling legislation by the Legislature that year, and two additional increases over the last
ten years have brought that amount to $20,000 at present. [See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7361(b)(2) (Purdon 1982).]
Id.
38. See, e.g., In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). In Smith, the petitioner had challenged the validity of a com-
mon pleas court rule which had been "adopted in pursuance of this [arbitration] legislation,"
381 Pa. at 225, 112 A.2d at 627. Specifically, the petitioner objected that the rule would
deprive him of a jury trial except under" 'burdensome, oppressive and unreasonable condi-
tions.' " 381 Pa. at 228, 112 A.2d at 628. The rule provided for compulsory arbitration, and
although de novo appeals were permitted, the appealing party was required to pay the cost
of the arbitrator's compensation, $25 per person or $75 total, as a condition for the right to
appeal. 381 Pa. at 227-30, 112 A.2d at 628-30.
The court rejected petitioner's challenges. It held that because the arbitrators' award
was not final and the right to jury trial was preserved, the right to jury trial had not been
violated. 381 Pa. at 230-31, 112 A.2d at 629. The court further noted that "[aill that is
required is that the right of appeal for the purpose of presenting the issue to a jury must not
be burdened by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which
would make the right practically unavailable." 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629. The court
concluded that the "requirement of the payment of costs before the entry of an appeal in
order to obtain a jury trial" was not an infringement on the constitutional right to a jury
trial, guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the constitution. 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629
(citations omitted).
A subsequent case challenged the validity of the Arbitration Act asserting that it
violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, article V, section 15 "which provides that: 'All
judges required to be learned in the law, . . . shall be elected'...." Talhelm v. Buggy, 9
Pa. D. & C.2d 482, 486 (1955) (quoting PA. CONST., art. V, § 15). The court determined that,
although members of the arbitration board may engage in judicial activities, they are not
judges, but are state officials in much the same way as court appointed masters, board mem-
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tlement,3 9 reduced the civil case backlog,' and reduced the cost of
dispute resolution to both litigants and courts.4 It has proved to be a
model for effective dispute resolution around the country.4 2
This brief account of arbitration's history reveals several patterns
that are instructive in examining contemporary proposals in the federal
courts. Arbitration frequently has emerged as an independent alterna-
tive to judicial dispute resolution, usually in response to the practical
needs of commercial parties. The reaction of the judiciary and the bar
has been to attempt, generally with success, to eliminate this source of
competition.
Despite the early development of a sophisticated arbitration sys-
tem independent of the courts in Pennsylvania, judicial resistance and
interference eventually spelled such a system's doom in that state as
well.43 Rather than falling into disuse, however, arbitration in Penn-
sylvania ceased to be independent and came under judicial supervision;
ultimately it was limited to relatively minor disputes. Thus the threat
of a body of commercial law developing independently of the judiciary
disappeared because courts were authorized by statute to set aside
awards for factual or legal errors. And the parties gained the benefit of
judicial enforcement of the award." This fundamental adaptation of
arbitration, together with other historical factors that make alternative
dispute-resolution mechanisms attractive, such as long delays and an
hers of the Workmen's Compensation Board, or members of the Public Utilities Commis-
sion. 9 Pa. D. & C.2d, at 486.
39. See A. LEVIN & E. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 49-50 (1961). See also Rosenberg & Schubin, TrialBy
Lawyer. Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448,
455-56 (1960).
"Complusory arbitration of small claims, instituted in Pennsylvania in 195 1, has dis-
posed of more than 41,000 cases in Philadelphia County alone in the [first] seven years [of
the program]." Note, Arbitration and Award--Study Predicts Effects of Increase in Jurisdic-
tional Amount of Compulsory Arbitration, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1965).
40. In Philadelphia County, "[w]hen compulsory arbitration was instituted, over 7000
cases were backlogged in that court with the list growing every month. Recent reports indi-
cate that the list is current .... " Note, supra note 39, at 1118 (quoting A. LEVIN & E.
WOOLLEY, supra note 39, at 47-48). The removal of the small claims also expedites the
disposition of larger cases. Note, supra note 35, at 418.
41. See Terrill, supra note 37, at 16, col. 1, 2. "The arbitration program saves money in
the form of the cost of courtroom operation, salaries, jury fees and related expenses." Id. at
col. 2.
42. Note, supra note 37, at 483. "The compulsory arbitration program in Pennsylvania
has been described as 'the oldest, most refined, most utilized and most copied of any arbitra-
tion program. . . in the United States.'" Id citing JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27 (1972).
43. See H. HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 151-54.
44. See id. at 152-53.
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elected judiciary,45 may explain why arbitration is today an accepted
component of the Pennsylvania state court system.
Court-annexed arbitration has proved an effective innovation in
jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania. By 1977, when the federal arbi-
tration experiment began, at least ten states had some form of court-
annexed arbitration. 6
C. Contemporary Proposals in the Federal System
A conservative philosophy initially dominated the American judi-
cial system.4 7 Although our civil courts have been the subject of popu-
lar dissatisfaction from their inception,48 the system characteristically
has failed to respond quickly to evolving conditions.49  Dean Roscoe
Pound noted over seventy-five years ago that "[the system] does not
change until those ill effects are felt, often not until they are felt
acutely."50
At the annual meeting of the ABA in 1958, Chief Justice Earl
Warren described a heavy backlog of federal cases, then nearly 70,000,
which was causing excessive delay in the civil docket5 and was threat-
ening the fairness of the judicial system. 2 The Judicial Conference
45. See Above the Law, Philadelphia Inquirer (Special Reprint of articles appearing
May 15-17, 1983) (describing problems with Pennsylvania's elected state judiciary).
46. Hearings, supra note 2, at 21 (statement of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell).
47. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
48. See generally, Address by Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration ofJustice, at the American Bar Association meeting in St. Paul, Minne-
sota (Aug. 26, 1906), reprinted in Proceedings in Commemoration ofthe Address. . .by Ros-
coe Pound, 35 F.R.D. 241, 273 (1964) [hereinafter cited as POUND]. Pound explained:
Our system of courts is archaic and our procedure behind the times. Uncer-
tainty, delay and expense, and above all, the injustice of deciding cases upon points of
practice, which are the mere etiquette of justice, direct results of the organization our
courts and the backwardness of our procedure, have created a deep-seated desire to
keep out of court, right or wrong, on the part of every sensible business man in the
community.
1d. (emphasis added).
49. Address by Chief Justice Burger, State ofthe Judiciary-1970, at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting in St. Louis, Missouri (Aug., 1970) reprinted in 56 A.B.A.J. 929
(1970) [hereinafter cited as State ofthe Judiciary].
50. POUND, supra note 48, at 277-78.
51. See Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Problem ofDelay." A Taskfor Bench
and BarAlike, American Bar Association Annual Meeting in Los Angeles, California (Aug.
25, 1958) reprinted in 44 A.B.A.J. 1043, 1044 (1958) [hereinafter cited as The Problem of
Delay]. The Chief Justice further noted in 1958 that "nearly 40 percent of all civil cases in
federal district courts [were] subject to undue delay-from one to four years between the
dates of issue and trial." Id. at 1044.
52. Id. at 1043. Chief Justice Warren remarked, "I must report that interminable and
unjustifiable delays in our courts are today compromising the basic legal rights of countless
thousands of Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of constitu-
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had found that the average time from issue date to trial in the federal
system should be about six months, but only seven out of ninety-four
districts had met that standard.13 Warren asserted that judges were not
responsible for the delay-they were handling 232 cases a year com-
pared with 168 cases in 1941.14 To reduce the backlog and delay, War-
ren recommended a number of changes in the system, including
increasing the number of judges and the initiation of pretrial confer-
ences in most civil cases.55
In 1959, other proposals suggested that some form of compulsory
arbitration could help relieve the federal backlog. An early legislative
proposal called for compulsory arbitration for automobile tort actions
brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction. 56 Since the early
1950's diversity litigation had been recognized as a major source of
court congestion.
In the same year, Wayland Elsbree, the president and editor of The
Philadelphia Legal Inteligencer, responded to Chief Justice Warren's
speech by proposing that the federal system adopt a compulsory arbi-
tration scheme to reduce the civil backlog rather than simply increasing
the number of judges or use of pretrial conferences. 5 He suggested
further that the success of the Pennsylvania compulsory arbitration
program could be duplicated at the federal level.59 It was to take al-
most twenty more years before these proposals for changes in the fed-
eral court system produced any tangible results. By 1970, pending
federal cases had increased to 114,117,60 and district court judges were
tional government in the United States." Id See also Note, supra note 35, at 410. "The
passage of time causes memories to dim and witnesses to die or disappear. And a plaintiff
with a just claim may be deterred from prosecuting it or be compelled to make an inequita-
ble settlement by financial inability to wait for trial." Id. (citations omitted).
53. The Problem of Delay, supra note 51, at 1044.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1046.
56. See S. 2415, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The bill was "introduced by Senator Scott
of Pennsylvania, authorizing arbitration of 'certain automobile cases coming before the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States.' " Note, supra note 39, at 1117 n.9 (quoting S. 2415, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)).
57. See State of Judiciary, supra note 49, at 930. "Today automobile cases are the larg-
est single category of civil cases." Id.
58. See Elsbree, supra note 35, passim. Elsbree noted that "there is a serious doubt
whether the courts have the manpower to pretry cases and achieve settlements thereby in a
volume sufficient to place the work of the courts on a current basis ...... Id. at 336. He
further commented that "[it is doubtful whether our legislatures or Congress will look
kindly upon any increase [in judges] that would be needed to wipe out the backlog of cases
now existing in some courts." Id. at 337.
59. Id.
60. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS-1975 at 126 (Na-
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terminating an average of 345 cases per year." This gloomy condition
of the federal courts prompted Chief Justice Warren Burger in his first
State of the Judiciary address to note that the failure to heed Roscoe
Pound's warnings had resulted in "still trying to operate the courts with
fundamentally the same basic methods, the same procedures, and the
same machinery [Pound] said were not good enough in 1906. "62 Bur-
ger outlined eight major steps to meet the crisis, including the forma-
tion of a judicial council that would consider, among other proposals,
eliminating diversity jurisdiction for automobile collision cases. 63
By 1976, when Chief Justice Burger helped convene the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice (the Pound Conference), conditions in the federal sys-
tem had continued to deteriorate. Pending cases were approaching
160,000 and average terminations per judge had increased to 375.64
Median time from issue date to trial for civil cases had remained rela-
tively constant since 1970 at approximately eleven to twelve months;
65
but weighted filings per judge, which give heavier weight to cases
known to be of a more difficult and time-consuming nature,66 had
jumped from 273 in 1970 to 432 in 1976.67
Favorably impressed with the results of state programs, several
participants at the Pound Conference proposed arbitration as a poten-
tial remedy to meet the increasing overload of cases in both federal and
state courts.68 Chaired by former Circuit Judge Griffin B. Bell, the fol-
low-up task force to the Pound Conference endorsed these proposals by
recommending the experimental use of arbitration in the federal
system.69
tional Statistical Profile from 1970-75) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-
1975].
61. Id.
62. State ofthe Judiciary, supra note 49, at 929.
63. Id. at 933-34.
64. Compare MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS-1980 at 129
(National Statistical Profile from 1975-80) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-
1980] with supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the condition of the federal
courts in 1958).
65. Compare MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1975, supra note 60, at 126 with MANAGE-
MENT STATISTICS-1980, supra note 64, at 129.
66. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1980, supra note 64, at d.
67. Compare MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1975, supra note 60, at 126 with MANAGE-
MENT STATISTICS-1980, supra note 64, at 129.
68. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1981). The authors' conclusions were based on the
positive results attained by the several state courts in which court-annexed arbitration was
operating. Id passim.
69. See id. at 1-2.
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When Judge Bell became Attorney General in 1977, he demon-
strated his concern for this area of judicial reform by promptly creating
a new office of Improvements in the Administration of Justice.7"
Under the direction of Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Meador,
the new office was charged initially with developing a wide range of
court reform proposals. At the state level this included the creation of
three neighborhood justice centers and a proposed national center for
dispute resolution. At the federal level these proposals included in-
creasing the use and power of magistrates, reducing or eliminating di-
versity jurisdiction, and "a proposal for court-annexed arbitration of
civil cases in the federal courts." 7'
The Justice Department drafted a bill that would "authorize" from
five to eight federal courts to experiment with court-annexed arbitra-
tion in specific types of civil cases, and submitted it to Congress in Oc-
tober, 1977.72 Although Congress did not enact this legislation, it
concurred in the need to experiment with court-annexed arbitration
and appropriated funding for three federal district courts that had
adopted compulsory arbitration in early 1978 by local rule7 3 at the sug-
gestion of the Justice Department.74 Congress and the Justice Depart-
ment made provisions for the Federal Judicial Center to evaluate these
programs after approximately two years.75 Congress then could review
the programs to determine whether to continue funding and whether to
encourage or to mandate expansion.76
Thus, a decade of effort to implement an arbitration program ulti-
mately culminated in a tangible result. To test various aspects of the
proposed court-annexed arbitration plans and to meet local needs and
conditions, the three federal courts, the Northern District of California,
the District of Connecticut (which since has dropped-out of the pro-
gram), and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, each adopted rules
incorporating different requirements.77 Bringing this effort full circle,
70. See Nejelski, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 14 FORUM 215, 215 (1978).
71. Id.
72. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 16-17.
73. D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 28; N.D. CAL. R. Civ. P. 500, E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 49, cited in full
in E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at Appendix A.
74. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 2; Hearings, supra note 2, at 20-21.
75. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 2; Hearings, supra note 2, at 21.
76. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 21.
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The program in the District of Connecti-
cut operated from April 1978 to February 1981. ARBITRATION SUMMARY OF DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT (198 1) (on file with the Maryland Law Review). During that period only 449
of the 5425 civil cases that were filed in that district (representing 8% of those cases) were
eligible for arbitration. Id. The district's program was unique because it provided for a
control group of non-eligible cases that had the same characteristics as the eligible cases. E.
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in May, 1978, judges from the three experimental districts discussed
specific details of their respective programs with Justice Department
officials and staff members of congressional committees at a conference
held at the Federal Judicial Center18 and attended by Chief Justice
Burger and Attorney General Bell.7 9
II. THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ARBITRATION
PROGRAM
According to Attorney General Bell, the courts in the three experi-
mental districts had adopted the arbitration programs with the inten-
tion of achieving two specific goals: "(1) speeding up the resolution of
cases that are now settled, and (2) resolving more quickly and less ex-
pensively many of the cases that now go to trial."8 To achieve these
goals, three major criteria were used to determine the specific catego-
ries of civil cases that would be selected for automatic referral to
arbitration.8 '
First, as originally established, each local rule limited the claim to
money damages.82 Equitable issues, often more complex and requiring
continued judicial supervision, were excluded.83 Second, the local rules
limited money damages to $100,000 in the Northern District of Califor-
nia and to $50,000 in the District of Connecticut and the Eastern Dis-
LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 19. The results of the experiment show that 112
eligible cases were terminated during the period but only 100 control group cases were ter-
minated. Twenty arbitration hearings were held, and in 13 of those cases a demand for trial
de novo was made. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY OF THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(1981).
The program in the Northern District of California has operated since April 1, 1978.
E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 7. During the first four years of the program only
21 trials de novo were held. Letter from Lee Derm, Arbitration Coordinator to Andrew
Zeldin (July 1, 1982). The arbitration coordinator has noted that although 58% of the eligi-
ble cases "had request[ed] trials de novo almost all settle before trial." He concluded that
"the feedback on these cases is that the arbitration helped greatly in the settlement of the
cases." Interview with Lee Derin, Arbitration Coordinator (July 12, 1982).
In an updated study, John Shapard estimated that the trial rate for eligible cases
during the first two years of the program will be between 3.0 and 3.4% after all the cases are
terminated. The actual percentage of eligible cases which did reach trial, however, is now
only about 2.33%, with another 2.78% pending trial. See J. SHAPARD, UPDATED ANALYSIS
OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 2 (1982) (on file
with the Maryland Law Review).
78. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 135-39. See also Nejelski, supra note 70, at 217.
79. Hearings, supra note 2, at 136.
80. 1d. at 17.
81. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
82. See E.D. PA. R. CIv. P. 8.3(l)(B); 8.3(2)(B); Nejelski, supra note 70, at 218. See also
Hearings, supra note 2, at 22.
83. Nejelski, supra note 70, at 218.
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trict of Pennsylvania in the belief that larger claims likely would be too
complex for arbitration and that more trials de novo would result be-
cause of the larger amounts in controversy. 84 Although the rules, as
originally designed, were intended to refer primarily factual rather
than legal questions to arbitration, 5 as implemented, both questions of
law and of fact are considered by the arbitration panel.
A. How It Works
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 86 became the first of the
three pilot district courts to adopt a court-annexed arbitration program
when it adopted Local Rule 49 on February 1, 1978.87 The court has
since extended the program indefinitely with the adoption of Local
Rule 8.88 Under the general limitations discussed previously, this rule
provides for compulsory arbitration in even more circumscribed situa-
tions. Where the United States is a party, the action must be brought
under: (1) the Federal Tort Claims Act, (2) the Longshoremen and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, or (3) the Miller Act.89 Where the
United States is not a party and federal jurisdiction exists, the action
must be: (1) for injury or death of a seaman under the Jones Act,
(2) based on a negotiable instrument or contract (generally all of which
are diversity cases), (3) for personal injury or property damage (also
virtually all of which are diversity cases), or (4) for personal injury
under the Federal Employees Liability Act.9" Cases based on a
claimed violation of a right secured by the Constitution are not
included.
The process begins when a complaint is filed with the district
court. One of the two full-time deputy court clerks who work solely on
the arbitration program9 determines whether the case meets the re-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a large metropolitan district which holds
court in Allentown, Philadelphia, and Reading. There are nineteen federal judges in the
district. The complexity and large number of cases in that district have made it fourth
among the ninety-four districts in civil case termination. See Projected Workload and Staff-
ing Requirements: Fiscal Year 1985, REPORT OF CLERK OF COURTS FOR U.S. DISTRICT
COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 9 (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
The district was also second of all the metropolitan district courts in the filing of average and
heavier-than-average cases. Id.
87. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 7. The local rules were adopted on
April 1, 1978 in the District of Connecticut and the Northern District of California. Id.
88. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at I.
89. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.3.
90. Id.
91. Interview with Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (July 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Kunz Interview].
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quirements for Local Rule 8.92 If so, the clerk stamps the case as eligi-
ble for arbitration unless one of the attorneys "certifies" that damages
are in excess of $50,000.93 The court may disregard the certification if
it is not satisfied that the damages will actually reach that amount.94
After the answer is filed, the clerk's office immediately notifies the
attorneys that the case will be referred to an arbitration panel.95 The
notice further advises them of the date set for the hearing, which is
approximately five months from the date of the notice.96 The attorneys
also are informed that they will have 120 days in which to complete
discovery. 97
The case is referred to arbitration on expiration of the 120 day
discovery period,9" unless the judge expands or contracts that period.
If a party files a motion for summary judgment or similar relief before
the referral, the action generally will not proceed to arbitration until
after the court rules on the motion.99 Once the court has referred a case
to arbitration, it usually will not stay the proceedings for a motion for
summary judgment. o
Prehearing settlements and dismissals prevail in district court,
thereby eliminating the need, in most cases, for an arbitration hear-
ing.101 If the case is not settled or dismissed beforehand, however, the
judge refers the case to arbitration by signing an order confirming the
date and appointing the three arbitrators approximately thirty days
before the date scheduled for the hearing.10 2
Panels composed of three volunteer lawyers chosen by the court
conduct the arbitration hearings."0 3 The provisions of Rule 8 require
that an arbitrator must have been a member of the bar of the highest
92. Broderick, Schedule "B" Arbitration, in REPORT OF THE HONORABLE ALFRED L.
LUONGO, CHIEF JUDGE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, THE 45TH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 4(1982)
[hereinafter cited as Broderick]. The case is then assigned to a judge who formally refers it
to arbitration. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.4.
93. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.3.
94. Id.
95. See Broderick, supra note 92, at 5.
96. id.
97. Id.
98. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.4(a) requiring:
In the event that a third party is brought into the action, this notice shall not be sent
until an answer has been filed by the third party.
99. See Ledwith, Federal Court Arbitration.- The Philadelphia Story, FOR THE DEFENSE
12, 13 (April, 1982).
100. See Broderick, supra note 92, at 6.
101. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 2.
102. See Broderick, supra note 92, at 6.
103. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.1, 8.4.
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court of a state or of the District of Columbia for at least five years and
must have been admitted to practice before the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania."° In addition, the Chief Judge must
make the determination that the individual is "competent to perform
the duties of an arbitrator."' 5
After lawyers have been certified, the clerk's office places their
names on one of three lists.'° 6 The lawyer makes the determination as
to whether he is primarily a plaintiffs' lawyer, a defense lawyer, or can-
not be categorized. 10 7 In the alternative, the parties have the option of
selecting their own panel, provided that the arbitrators are qualified to
serve. 1
0 8
Arbitrators must disqualify themselves from any action in which
they are biased-including "any action where a justice, judge, or mag-
istrate . . . would be required to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 455." '1 In
addition, the members of the panel must take the oath or affirmation
prescribed by section 453 of that title before the hearing."
The clerk's office schedules the panel to serve at three hearings,"'
usually all completed in one day, and each arbitrator is paid $75 per
hearing."12 The hearings generally are held from four to six months
after the complaint is filed. The arbitrators are authorized to change
the date and time of the hearing provided the hearing is commenced
within thirty days of the hearing date set forth in the court's order. All
other continuances must be sought from the judge."I3 At the hearing
the Federal Rules of Evidence are used, but in an informal manner." 
4
104. Id. at 8.1.
105. Id. at 8.1(b)(3).
106. Interview with Janis Lutz, Arbitration Clerk for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Jan. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Lutz Interview].
107. Id. There are presently 823 attorneys who have been certified to serve as arbitrators.
ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 7.
108. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.4(b). The parties rarely, if ever, exercise the option of choosing
their own panel. See Lutz Interview, supra note 106.
109. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.4(c).
110. Id. at 8.1(c).
111. See Broderick, supra note 92, at 5. See also Lutz Interview, supra note 106.
112. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.2. "In the event that the arbitration hearing is protracted, the
courts will entertain a petition for additional compensation." Id. Arbitrators in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania are not reimbursed for expenses incurred in performing their duty,
i.e., travel, meals. Compare E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.2 with S. 2253, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. § 643
(1978). Senate Bill 2253, the Court-Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978, if passed, would have
provided reimbursement to arbitrators for actual expenses. This type of reimbursement
seems warranted, particularly for travel and clerical expenses.
113. The judges' policies vary from freely granting continuances to granting them only in
extreme emergencies. Lutz Interview, supra note 106.
114. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.5(0. For example, expert testimony is normally not
needed to authenticate medical records, but the adverse party must receive a copy of the
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Unless a party requests that a court reporter be present and agrees to
bear the cost of the recording, no written transcript is made of the pro-
ceeding." 5 After hearing the testimony of the parties and of the wit-
nesses, the panel renders its decision by promptly filing an award with
the clerk." 16
Either party may fie a written demand for a trial de novo in the
district court within thirty days after the filing of the award." 7 The
clerk's office treats the complaint as if it had not been referred to arbi-
tration." 8 No prejudice attaches from the arbitration award." 9 Evi-
dence from the hearing is admissible at trial only for impeachment
purposes.120 No additional cost is assessed for filing for trial de novo.
But upon making a demand for trial de novo, the moving party gener-
ally must deposit a sum equal to the arbitration fees with the court. If
the moving party fails to obtain a judgment at trial that is more
favorable than the arbitration award, exclusive of interest and costs,
that deposit is lost.' 2 1
B. Challenges to the Program
A test of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's experiment was not
long in coming. The challengers, defendants in the diversity action of
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, demanded a jury trial under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 38(b) and moved to prohibit arbitration and to va-
cate the order of referral. 22 They challenged the arbitration program
as violating: (1) the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh
amendment, (2) equal protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment,
and (3) several rules of federal civil procedure and federal statutes
dealing with limitations on the court's rulemaking authority. 23 The
district court upheld the program's validity on each ground. 24
exhibit ten days before the hearing. Unless the adverse party notifies counsel at least five
days prior to the hearing that he intends to contest the authenticity of any exhibit, the arbi-
trator will receive the exhibit into evidence without formal proof. Id. Thus the hearing can
progress expeditiously, with some of the facts and evidence stipulated to by the parties.
Interview with Judge Raymond J. Broderick, Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (July 12, 1982).
115. See Broderick, supra note 92, at 7.
116. See Lutz Interview, supra note 106.
117. See E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.7(a). If the 30-day period expires without filing for trial de
novo, the decision becomes final. See id. at 8.6.
118. Id. at 8.7(b).
119. Id. at 8.7(c).
120. Id.
121. id. at 8.2, 8.7(d).
122. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 577.
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1. The seventh amendment issue-The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the seventh amendment did not fossilize jury trials as
they were practiced in 1791; rather, matters of form and procedure may
be modified so long as the substance of the right is preserved. 25 In
distinguishing substantive change from procedural innovations, the
Kimbrough court looked to the series of Supreme Court decisions over
the last decade that have held six-member juries permissible under the
seventh amendment. 
26
Ex parte Peterson, 27 however, quoted by the Kimbrough court,
provides a closer analogy. In that case, the Court upheld a district
court's order appointing an auditor, without the parties' consent, to ex-
amine documents and to hear testimony on the case's complex factual
questions in order to narrow and to clarify the issues for trial. Because
all final determinations were made by the jury, the Court found that
the auditor's hearing did not infringe upon the right to a jury trial, even
though no official exercising the powers delegated to the auditor existed
in England or America in 1791.128 Court-annexed arbitration, like the
auditor's hearing, does not finally determine any factual questions if
the case goes to trial.' 29 Additionally, the Peterson Court found that,
rather than imposing a burden on the exercise of the right in terms of
cost or delay, "such a tentative trial [the auditor's hearing] acts as a
sifting process by which misunderstandings and misconceptions as to
facts are frequently removed."' 3 ° Similarly, arbitration assists in trial
preparation by clarifying and simplifying the issues. Because discovery
must be conducted in any event, the only additional burden imposed
by court-annexed arbitration is the one-day hearing, which seems no
more onerous than the "full hearing" described in Peterson. "
Noting the absence of federal cases concerning compulsory arbi-
tration, the Kimbrough court also looked to cases upholding Penn-
sylvania's compulsory arbitration programs under Pennsylvania's
constitution. In Smith's Case, 3 2 the Pennsylvania court ruled that
compulsory arbitration neither finally determined the rights of persons
or property for seventh amendment purposes nor imposed onerous
125. Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
126. 478 F. Supp. at 568-69 (discussing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)).
127. Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
128. Id. at 307-09.
129. 478 F. Supp. at 569 (citing Capital Traction Co. v. Hof., 174 U.S. 1, 19, 23 (1899)).
130. 253 U.S. at 307.
131. Id. at 306-07.
132. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1958).
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conditions on the right's exercise. 3 3 Similarly, the Pennsylvania court
in Parker v. Children's Hospital3 4 held that the state's medical mal-
practice arbitration program did not unduly burden the exercise of the
right to a jury trial, even though the losing party on appeal would be
charged all costs of both arbitration and trial if the court found the
appeal was arbitrarily or capriciously taken. 135 The Kimbrough court
likewise evaluated the burden of arbitrator's fees imposed by Rule 49
[later Rule 8] on litigants who fare no better at trial than at arbitration,
and concluded that "[t]he conditions for appeal de novo do not out-
weigh the benefits of arbitration in providing an efficient alternative for
dispute-resolution."' 36 In sum, although the court acknowledged that
court-annexed arbitration, in some instances, may burden a defend-
ant's access to a jury trial, it concluded that the seventh amendment
was flexible enough to tolerate such experimentation.
2. The equalprotection issue-The Kimbrough defendants alleged
that the program violated their equal protection rights guaranteed by
the fifth amendment because litigants in other districts, as well as liti-
gants with greater amounts in controversy within the district, were
treated differently from the litigants in that case. 37 Because the court
found that the program did not interfere with the seventh amend-
ment-the only fundamental right potentially implicated-it applied a
"rational-basis" test in evaluating the program. 138 The court concluded
that the local rule was rationally related to important government in-
terests: "promoting [the] speedier administration of justice and [the] ef-
ficient use of resources."' 139 Hence the court held that the program did
not violate the fifth amendment.
133. 381 Pa. at 230-31, 112 A.2d at 629-30. See supra note 38 for a discussion of Smith.
134. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
135. Id. at 120, 394 A.2d at 939. The part of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act
(section 309 of the Act, 40 P.S. § 1301.309) that gave health care arbitration panels exclusive
jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims was subsequently declared unconstitutional by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
The court determined that the "lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system... bur-
denled] the right of a jury trial with 'onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which
.. .made the right practically unavailable.' " 491 Pa. at 395, 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting In re
Smith, 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629).
136. 478 F. Supp. at 571.
137. Id. at 575. Because the arbitration program was a federal court innovation, the court
noted that "equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment [did] not technically apply
... . Consequently, defendants ground[ed] their equal protection allegation in Fifth
Amendment due process." Id. at 574 n.19.
138. Id. at 574.
139. Id. at 576. The court noted that arbitration programs existed in only three federal
districts and that the procedures vary in each of those districts causing "allegedly 'unequal
treatment' " of litigants in and between those districts. But "[tihe local arbitration rule is a
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3. The statutory and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure issues-The
court further determined that the local rule 40 was consistent with both
the federal statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 ' The
defendants challenged the program under the federal statutes that pro-
vide rulemaking power to the Supreme Court and to the district courts,
which specifically preserve "the right of trial by jury as at common law
and as declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution.'
' 42
The defendant also alleged that Local Rule 49 violated Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83, which requires local rules to be consistent with the
federal rules, because Local Rule 49 interfered with their right to a jury
trial immediately upon demand under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 38 and 39. 143 The Kimbrough court in essence concluded that
none of these provisions provided "a more expansive right to jury trial
than the seventh amendment," and hence were not violated by Local
Rule 49.'"
III. EVALUATION
In testimony supporting legislation for court-annexed arbitration,
Attorney General Griffin Bell stated that such programs sought to
"broaden access for the American people to their justice system and to
provide mechanisms that will permit the expeditious resolution of dis-
putes at a reasonable cost."1 45 To achieve this objective, an arbitration
program would have to reduce the time and expense of litigation while
preserving the quality of justice. 146
Court-annexed arbitration seeks to address the problems of back-
log and increasing expense in litigation in several respects. For the eli-
gible litigants, the program offers a faster, less costly method of
resolving their disputes. As an alternative to the judicial system, arbi-
tration potentially can offer savings in the time and cost inherent in an
individual civil trial. For the judicial system, arbitration can reduce the
demand on judicial resources created by overcrowded dockets. It also
reduces expenditures for the system by resolving cases at a lesser cost
than would be required for the judicial system to reach the same result.
Court-annexed arbitration cannot be considered successful, however, if
first step to develop a fast, efficient, and inexpensive system of dispute resolution on a na-
tional scale." Id. at 575.
140. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 49.
141. 478 F. Supp. at 572-73.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
143. 478 F. Supp. at 572 nn. 12-14.
144. Id. at 573.
145. Hearings, supra note 2, at 21.
146. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at viii.
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it produces results of an inferior quality. If the result varies signifi-
cantly from the norm produced by the judicial system, litigants will
perceive and possibly will suffer a denial of the fundamental goals of
our legal system: justice and fairness.
In empirically evaluating the program's performance, 147 two limi-
tations on the data must be kept in mind. First, no control group ex-
isted in the civil caseload with characteristics similar to the
experimental eligible caseload. 4 ' Consequently, to test the program's
ability to reduce time and expense, comparisons must be made to ad-
justed data from earlier civil cases or from similar jurisdictions., 49 Sec-
ond, to the extent that the program's success can be determined, the
applicability of those results to other jurisdictions may be limited. The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoyed several circumstances-such
as prior experience with a state program of court-annexed arbitration
and lawyer acceptance of the program-that might not exist
elsewhere. 1
50
A. Time and Expense
Rule 8 was intended to decrease the time and expense required for
the disposition of civil actions by (1) decreasing the pending caseload,
(2) encouraging early case settlement, (3) requiring that the arbitration
hearing be held promptly, (4) reducing the time of the hearing itself,
and (5) terminating the case through acceptance of the arbitration
award. 5 '
1. Impact on the system-Since the program began, the pending
civil caseload in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has increased
every year except 1982,152 and the combined civil and criminal filings
have increased each year.' 53 If the program effectively can reduce the
caseload, it will save judges' time which can be devoted to other cases,
147. The data used for this evaluation was collected from: E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra
note 68; J. SHAPARD, supra note 77; ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1 9 8 3 , supra note 3; REPORT
OF THE HONORABLE ALFRED L. LUONGO, CHIEF JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE 45TH ANNUAL JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT (1982); MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS for the years 1982 and 1978.
148. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 18-19.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
151. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 7-13.
152. See MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS-1982, at 35 [hereinaf-
ter cited as MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1982]. In 1978 the pending caseload in the Eastern
District was 4737. By 1981 it rose to 5247, but it dropped to 5146 in 1982. Id.
153. Id. In 1978 combined filings were 5024; in 1982 they had increased to 6155.
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and it will save the system the expense of handling at least a portion of
the increased demand.
The data suggests that the program has produced savings. Of all
civil cases on the docket, 18.5% were eligible for the program in its first
five years.' 54 Of these eligible cases, 86% were terminated within the
same period, with only 1.8%15" requiring a trial de novo. The median
time for termination of eligible cases was five months from date of is-
sue.'5 6 Although the majority of ineligible civil cases also have been
terminated before trial, largely through negotiated settlements, these
cases seem to have demanded more judicial attention than cases in the
program.'57 The program thus has terminated 15.25%15s of all civil
cases without substantial judicial involvement, and has terminated
them expeditiously.
Examination of the factors outside the program provides addi-
tional support for a positive conclusion. The increasing rate of
filings' 59 has seen a corresponding increase in the rate of civil case ter-
minations per judgeship. 160 The weighted filings per judgeship also
have increased since the adoption of the arbitration program.
16 1 If
these heavier weighted, more complex cases are the ones being termi-
nated at the current rate, the program possibly has permitted the judges
to spend more time on more difficult cases by removing the less compli-
cated actions from their workload. Moreover, since the program be-
gan, the Eastern District has had a total of 45.4 vacant judgeship
154. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 2.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1.
157. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 9-12.
158. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 2. In the first five years of the pro-
gram, only 72 of the 4066 terminated cases required trials de novo. Thus, 3,994 cases
(15.6%) of the 25,547 civil cases were terminated without a civil trial. Id.
159. See supra note 153.
160. See MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1982, supra note 152, at 35.
Civil & Criminal Civil & Criminal
Filings Terminations
Year Per Judgeship Per Judgeship
1978 264 247
1979 270 268
1980 284 271
1981 296 285
1982 324 329
Despite the increased terminations per judgeship, the increased number of filings per
judgeship has made the goal of reducing the court backlog an elusive one in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. In 1982, however, the rate of termination per judgeship finally
exceeded the rate of filings.
161. Id. In 1978 weighted filings per judgeship were 288, increasing in 1982 to 381.
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months 162 compared to the five-year period preceding the program's
adoption when only 25.9 vacant judgeship months occurred. 16 3 Thus,
although correlation is not dispositive of causation, especially in a sys-
tem as complex as a federal district court, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania has been able to process more weighted cases more quickly
and with relatively fewer judges since the program's inception.
A reduction in the incidence of trials may have an incidental,
though not necessarily negligible, impact on the workload of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. A conservative trial rate for civil cases in the
arbitration program is about 2.5% 164 compared to approximately 5.5%
for similar cases in other jurisdictions.165 If, for example, 812 eligible
cases were terminated annually outside the program, at the normal
5.5% trial rate, approximately forty-five cases would be tried annually
in district court. At an appeals rate of ten percent, 166 4.5 cases could
require circuit court panels. Over the past five years, only seventy-two
eligible cases were tried in district court. 167 With an annual appeals
rate of ten percent, this would amount to an average of only 1.4 appeals
of eligible cases annually, a direct reduction of 4.1 appeals. Because
appeals are also taken from pre-trial disposition, e.g. summary judg-
ment, the program results in an additional indirect reduction in ap-
peals. The impact of the program would be greater if the scope of the
program were expanded by adding new classes of cases or increasing
the dollar limit.
The program's time savings at the trial level also can translate into
economic savings to the judicial system if the combined administrative
costs and arbitrators' fees amount to less than the cost of having these
eligible cases remain part of the civil caseload. Administrative costs
include the cost to the clerk's office of the two arbitration clerks and the
overhead attributed to processing the cases. 168 The arbitration clerks'
162. Id. The number of vacant judgeship months represents the "[n]umber of months
during [each] profile year that an authorized judgeship was not filled." Id. at d.
163. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS-1978, at 31.
164. See J. SHAPARD, supra note 77, at 3-5. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra
note 3, at 2 (stating that the average trial rate in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's arbi-
tration program was 1.8%).
165. See J. SHAPARD, supra note 77, at 4-5.
166. The 812 "eligible cases" figure is based upon the total number of cases terminated
over the past five years (4066). The trial rate is from J. SHAPARD, supra note 77, at 4-5. The
appeals rate is from MANAGEMENT STATISTICS-1982, supra note 152, at 4, 39.
167. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 2.
168. Interview, supra note 91. Usually arbitration hearings are held in an available court-
room, but if no courtroom space is available, a room must be rented in an office building.
Although rentals undoubtedly increase the cost of the compulsory arbitration system to
some extent, use of attorney/arbitrator's offices for hearings might cast doubt on the neutral,
judicial nature of the process.
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salaries have totalled $123,384 over the first 56 months, 169 and arbitra-
tors' fees over the past five years have added another $222,490 to the
program's costs.' 7 ° Assuming that the overhead cost would have re-
mained constant if the cases were in the general civil caseload, the cost
of the program less the overhead common to both the arbitration pro-
gram and the general civil caseload has totalled approximately
$345,874 over the past four and a half or five years.171
What would the cost be without the program? As described below,
the incidence of trial for civil cases with the same characteristics as
eligible cases would be about 5.5%. 172 This rate alone would add at
least an additional twenty-one trials in the district per year.
17 3
Nineteen district judges currently are assigned to the remaining 81.5%
non-eligible cases 174 and to additional criminal actions. The clerk of
the court has estimated that at least one additional judge would be re-
quired to handle the litigation that falls within the current program.'75
One judge and his staff alone costs approximately $180,000 per year or
$720,000 for the past four years. 176 These figures do not include the
cost of the chambers and facilities required for the judge and his
staff. 77 Even at this basic cost comparison level, it is obvious that the
arbitration program can save the judicial system not only time but
money.
The practical economies achieved by the program are not limited
to salaries and overhead. The realities of trying to add an additional
judge to the bench and finding additional chamber space in an already
crowded courthouse are forbidding.17 Finally, the arbitration pro-
169. Memorandum from Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of Court, to Andrew S. Zeldin (Nov.
19, 1982) (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
170. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 7.
171. See supra notes 169-70.
172. J. SHAPARD, supra note 77, at 4-5.
173. If the trial rate under the arbitration program is conservatively estimated at 2.5% and
the estimated trial rate of these cases would have been 5.5%, at 812 cases terminated per
year, the savings is approximately 24 trials, i.e., 3% of 812.
174. Although the 18.5% eligible cases remain on the judges' dockets, they generally do
not consume judicial time in the same way that non-eligible cases do. See Broderick, supra
note 92, at 4-6 (describing how a case proceeds to arbitration and the stages at which a
judge's involvement is necessary).
175. Kunz Interview, supra note 91.
176. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, COST TO THE JUDICIARY OF ESTAB-
LISHING A NEW DISTRICT JUDGESHIP (1981) (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
177. Cost of chamber space, furniture, library services, and travel expenses could exceed
$100,000 per year. Id.
178. See, e.g., The Problem of Delay, supra note 51, at 1046; Burger, Chief Justice Burger
Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189 (1976).
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gram saves the valuable time of judges and their chambers' staff.'7 9
2. Impact on the Litigants-The direct impact of the arbitration
program on the litigants whose cases fall within Rule 8 may be mea-
sured more reliably than the effect of the arbitration program on the
entire civil caseload.1 ° Examination suggests that the impact has been
favorable.
The program's benefit to the individual litigants often derives from
the strict timetable imposed by Rule 8. Although a great number of
civil cases are terminated through negotiated settlements, l81 many re-
main unsettled for a year or more while the attorneys direct their atten-
tions to more immediate concerns. 182  Attorneys often have no
incentive to settle their cases until it becomes absolutely necessary. 1
83
By contrast, Rule 8 requires that upon expiration of the 120 day period
or expiration of discovery, the eligible actions must be referred to arbi-
tration by judge's order.8 4 Nearly 64% of all terminated Rule 8 cases
were terminated before an order of referral.8 5 In the arbitration pro-
gram the median time from filing of the case to disposition was 150
days. 8 6 The time limitations placed on counsel to prepare within the
allotted time period appear to have expedited pre-hearing settlement in
at least some cases.
87
In addition to encouraging termination before a hearing, the pro-
gram allows eligible cases to reach the hearing stage in less time than
179. Kunz Interview, supra note 91.
180. The many factors that might affect the entire civil caseload (e.g. increased filings and
pending caseload) as well as the relatively small number of cases eligible for arbitration
(20%) make it difficult to test what effect the program has had on the civil caseload. Because
all. cases meeting the requirements of Local Rule 8 must be arbitrated, there is no control
group of similar cases with which to compare the effect of the arbitration program.
181. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 9-12.
182. Id. at 9.
183. Id. at 9-10.
184. E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 8.4(a).
185. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 3.
186. Id. at 29. The 2593 cases terminated prior to the entry of an order of referral to an
arbitrator were terminated in the following manner: 1336 cases (54.9%) by settlement or
dismissal; 1092 cases (38.6%) by court order or motion; and 165 cases (6.3%) by entry of
default judgment. Id. at 16.
187. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 48-50. The researchers noted that:
A likely explanation for these findings is that counsel in arbitration-eligible cases,
prompted by efforts of the clerk's office to schedule a hearing, turn their attention to the
case and initiate negotiations. Because a thorough examination of the strengths and
weaknesses of the case is necessary to prepare for the arbitration hearing, and because a
settlement at this point would avoid the expenditure of time and effort that would be
required if the hearing were held, termination of the case by settlement occurs earlier
than it would absent the arbitration rule.
Id. at 78.
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other civil cases. 88 The median time for eligible cases to reach an arbi-
tration hearing was five months. 89 The corresponding median time for
other civil cases to reach trial was approximately thirteen months.' 90
Several factors mitigate this direct comparison of the median time for
cases to reach arbitration hearings and cases to reach trial. First, the
characteristics of the eligible, arbitrated cases differ significantly in
complexity from non-eligible cases.' 9 ' Second, the arbitration hearing
does not necessarily end the litigation between the parties. 92 Arbi-
trated cases that are appealed could take even longer than thirteen
months to reach trial. 193 Although a low rate of actual trials de novo
exists, some cases proceed beyond the arbitration award for varying
lengths of time before terminating. Nevertheless, the impact of the pro-
gram on the amount of time required for an eligible case to reach an
initial hearing is substantial. Several economies of time result from re-
moving the case from the regular civil docket. For example, once the
judge signs the order appointing the arbitrators, the program's strict
deadlines, which may be extended only for good reason, apply. 94 Be-
cause eligible cases are not heard by juries, delays for jury selection are
eliminated. In addition, the backlog within the civil system does not
affect the eligible cases because they have been separated from the judi-
cial track. 195
Arbitration hearings themselves involve less time than that re-
quired for most civil trials. 196 Civil trials require application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and other formalities. Scheduling problems
often lead to continuance and other motions which could delay a trial.
Although arbitrators use the Federal Rules of Evidence as a "guide"
188. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 1.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 82-85, 89-90 and accompanying text (describing limitations on types
of cases eligible for arbitration).
192. Any party may request a trial de novo after the arbitration decision. E.D. PA. R.
Civ. P. 8.7(a). Chief Justice Burger cautioned that "we must . . . in setting up arbitration
procedures. . . make sure they become a realistic alternative rather than an additional step
in an already prolonged process." Burger, supra note 10, at 277.
193. But if the arbitration hearing serves as a "dress rehearsal" for trial, it may expedite
the pre-trial and trial process. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 12.
194. Lutz Interview, supra note 106.
195. Kunz Interview, supra note 91.
196. "A panel of arbitrators is assigned three cases, to start at 9:30 in the morning, and
can usually dispose of all three in one day." Ledwith, supra note 99, at 14. By contrast, on a
national level, the average jury trial in federal court is approximately 3.5 days long while the
average bench trial is approximately 1.9 days. G. BERMANT, J. CECIL, A. CHASET, E. LIND
& P. LOMBARD, PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR 86
(1981). After excluding trials lasting 20 days or longer from the data, the average jury trial
lasts 3.3 days and the average bench trial lasts 1.8 days. 1d.
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for the admission of evidence at arbitration hearings, parties often rely
on stipulation and other time-saving practices.'97 Once the case is
scheduled for a specific date, the hearing generally takes less than one
day. 198
As noted before, the arbitration program would not be considered
successful if a significant number of cases that completed the arbitra-
tion hearing subsequently returned for trial in district court. 99 Analy-
sis demonstrates that the great majority of eligible cases filed during the
past five years terminate without going to trial. Only seventy-two
cases, or 1.8% of all eligible cases terminated, required a trial de
novo.2°° The incidence of civil trials for cases outside the program in
the Eastern District averages greater than eight percent.2"'
When comparing the arbitration trial rate with the general civil
caseload trial rate, an additional factor must be accounted for: this
1.8% figure reflects only the percentage of all eligible cases that have
required trials de novo and does not take into account the cases that are
not yet terminated. Analysis of these 671 non-terminated cases does
not suggest, however, that trials de novo will predominate.20 2 Al-
though parties are awaiting trial de novo in seventy-one of these non-
terminated cases, not all will be tried. In the last five years, of the 508
cases appealed after an award, only 72 cases, or 14.9% of all cases ap-
pealed, resulted in a trial de novo.20 3 If this pattern continues, non-
terminated cases will not result in a substantially greater incidence of
trial than the current 1.8% of all eligible cases. Detailed analysis of the
program's first two years suggests that the trial rate should not exceed
197. E.D. PA. R. CIv. P. 8.5(0.
198. See supra note 196.
199. See supra notes 155, 192.
200. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 1.
201. But Shapard estimated that the trial rate for arbitration-type cases under $50,000 in
controversy would be approximately 5.5% without the program. See J. SHAPARD, supra note
77, at 4.
202. A review of the status of the non-terminated cases demonstrates that the majority are
in the initial stages of the arbitration process.
The status of the 671 cases eligible for arbitration which have not been terminated is
as follows: (a) 88 (13.1%) service of process has not been made; (b) 122 (18. 1%) an answer
has not yet been filed; (c) 78 (11.6%) the 120-day discovery period has not elapsed; (d) 58
(8.6%) motions are pending; (e) 16 (2.4%) have been transferred to the suspense docket; (f)
215 (32.2%) are scheduled for hearing; (g) 23 (3.4%) are awaiting expiration of the 20-day
time period for the filing of an appeal for trial de novo or entry of judgment; and (h) 71
(10.6%) a trial de novo is pending. See ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983 supra note 3, at 2-3.
203. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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three percent of all eligible cases. 2"
To isolate the impact of the arbitration program it is necessary to
compare the trial rate for eligible civil cases with the rate at which cases
would reach trial had they been in the general civil caseload. Because
the program did not include a control group of cases, it is helpful to
look at data collected in 1975 from the Eastern District and several
other metropolitan districts. This data shows that the incidence of trial
was about 15% for arbitration-type cases without any limit on amount
in controversy, and approximately 7% for those cases that met both the
subject matter and amount in controversy requirements of Rule 8.2o5
Since 1975, the trial rate for civil cases has fallen for all courts and it
has been estimated from annual court reports that for cases involving
the same subject matter controversies as the eligible cases, the rate is
now approximately 11%.2o 6 From that figure, Shapard concluded that
the trial rate would be about 5.5% for cases that meet the same subject
matter and amount in controversy criteria as the eligible cases.2 °7 At
the most conservative estimate, the trial rate for eligible cases is ap-
proximately one third (the difference between 5.5% and 3%) less than
what it would be if there were no arbitration program in the district.
B. Quality
No matter how great the savings of time and money afforded by
court-annexed arbitation, Rule 8 would not satisfactorily meet its goals
if it produced a lesser quality of justice. Analyzing the quality of jus-
tice under the arbitration program involves both objective and subjec-
tive considerations. 20 8 That is, arbitrations may produce objectively
correct or true results, but if those results vary significantly from judi-
cial dispositions in similar cases, the public may perceive them as un-
204. See Memorandum, supra note 169 (indicating that in 1978 and 1979 approximately
3% of all cases referred to arbitration ultimately went to trial).
Analysis of eligible cases filed
prior to 1979; prior to 1980
Total 1978 1979
Number of cases filed 8814 4063 4751
Number of cases referred to arbitration 1727 778 949
Number of demands for trial de novo 252 66 186
Number of trials held 38 20 18
Number of cases pending trial 15 2 13
205. J. SHAPARD, supra note 77, at 4.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 13-14. These evaluators admit the difficulty
in objectively evaluating the quality of justice.
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fair. Ascertaining the objective correctness of the results achieved by
arbitration or by the courts is beyond the scope of this article. Al-
though the lack of a control group also restricts evaluation of the sub-
jective quality of the program, some limited comparisons can be made.
Although a comparison of the results of cases in the arbitration
program with those in the civil courts does not exist, a favorable picture
emerges from comparison of the relative accuracy of the arbitration
awards with the results from trials de novo. In only twenty-five of the
seventy-two cases (34% percent) requiring trial de novo did a different
party prevail from the winner of the arbitration award.2 °9 In approxi-
mately two-thirds of the cases that reached trial de novo, the prevailing
party remained the same.
One potential criticism of this comparison, aside from the small
number of cases involved, is that the de novo verdicts actually repre-
sent the result of the litigants' second opportunity to try their cases. If
all civil cases could have a complete dress rehearsal, a similar rate of
reversal might result. This so-called "dress rehearsal" effect, however,
may strengthen the inference concerning the objective accuracy of the
arbitration award. In undergoing arbitration, the parties may discover
weaknesses and clarify the issues in their cases. The trial de novo
therefore would represent a refined presentation of the case.21 ° If coun-
sel thus make better presentations in trials de novo, and two-thirds of
the awards still survive, the relative accuracy of the award arguably is
reinforced and parties may be deterred from challenging the awards.
The low number of trials de novo alone may indicate subjective
acceptance of the awards by the parties. One might object that the ad-
ditional expense of a trial, as well as the potential imposition of a pen-
alty on the movant, might discourage a party from going to trial in
favor of acceptance of a post-hearing settlement or outright acceptance
of the award even if the loser felt it was unfair.2" This objection is
reinforced by the fact that the maximum amount at stake in these cases
is less than $50,000. These objections, however, are countered by the
realities of the arbitration process. Because the parties must conduct
discovery anyway, the only additional burden imposed by arbitration is
the hearing itself. But, as mentioned, hearings generally take no more
than one day and can provide a useful dress rehearsal for trial. The
failure of a party to seek trial de novo thus may mean that he is indeed
satisfied with the result.
209. ARBITRATION SUMMARY-1983, supra note 3, at 22-28.
210. See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 10.
211. Id. at 14.
[VOL. 42
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
Another available measure of acceptance comes from the opinions
of counsel who have participated in the arbitration program. Two
years after initiation of the program, researchers sent a questionnaire
regarding various aspects of the arbitration program to all participating
attorneys in the three experimental districts.21 2 Sixty-nine percent of
the attorneys responded, and they expressed approval of the individual
local rules by a margin of two to one.2 13 When cases terminated before
demand for trial de novo, 82% of responding counsel said that the final
outcome of their cases was fair to all parties involved. 214 This approval
percentage declined only slightly when cases terminated after demand
for trial de novo were considered. 2 5 This evidence of attorney ap-
proval rebuts initial concerns that arbitration panels, although designed
to consist of balanced partisan support, would tend to favor plain-
tiffs. 2 16 Moreover, discussing the perspective of the local bar, one com-
mentator has concluded that the arbitrators performed competently
and conscientiously.217
Attorneys responded differently when surveyed on questions con-
cerning time involved. In cases terminated without a demand for a
trial de novo, over two-thirds of the lawyers felt the program resolved
the cases more rapidly, but only approximately 40% thought that less of
their time or their clients' time was required.218 When cases involved a
demand for trial de novo, opinion shifted somewhat. Although 50%
still felt overall resolution was more rapid, a majority of attorneys re-
sponded that the case took more of their time and their clients' time.2 19
Researchers were unable to obtain opinions from a significant
sample of clients. But if the arbitration program does achieve ultimate
economies of time and money while achieving the same result that the
party would obtain in court parties should be relatively more satisfied
with arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Although our evaluation of the program has been qualified by the
data's limitations, especially the absence of a control group, some con-
clusions can be drawn with confidence. The indications are positive:
212. Id. at 57 n.16.
213. Id. at 60.
214. Id. at 59.
215. Id.
216. Ledwith, supra note 99, at 15.
217. Id.
218. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 68, at 59.
219. Id.
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the program has seen an increase in pre-hearing settlements, a reduc-
tion in the incidence of trials, and an expedited hearing process for
eligible cases-all of which have saved time and expense for the liti-
gants. The judicial system has benefited by the program's removal of
relatively uncomplicated cases from the dockets with little or no inter-
vention by judges. From all indications it appears that the quality of
justice has remained at the same level as that in the regular civil
caseload. Finally, the effect of the program on the rest of the civil
caseload has probably been beneficial because a substantial segment of
the potential backlog has been removed, thereby decreasing overall de-
lay and reducing the number of potential appeals.
As a result of these successes, the program has won the support of
both Chief Judge Alfred L. Luongo22° of the Eastern District and Chief
Judge Collins J. Seitz221 of the Third Circuit as a successful means of
expediting civil litigation.
Recently Griffin Bell noted: "I do not know why the arbitration
program has not caught on, but it has not. I think necessity is still the
mother of invention and we continue to add judges. . . . Most courts
are inclined to stay with their old ways. ' 222 Although the history of the
program's development is itself evidence of judicial inertia, surely a
time must come when the forces for change become irresistible. If the
sentiment currently expressed from within the highest levels of the ju-
diciary itself is any indication, that time has arrived.
As this article has sought to document, court-annexed arbitration
may provide a prescription to today's judicial malaise. The historical
antipathy of the bench and the bar to arbitration was based on consid-
erations that court-annexed arbitration does not raise: (1) the program
presents no competition for business-it is plain that the courts have
more than they can handle and the program in no way excludes attor-
neys; (2) the program presents no ideological threat to the development
of the law-it is controlled by the court itself and therefore represents a
reform originating within the judiciary, not independent of it.
When compared with the other contemporary proposals-aboli-
tion of diversity jurisdiction, increasing the number of judges as well as
the number and power of magistrates, and institution of pre-trial con-
ferences-court-annexed arbitration may offer the most viable solution
available. Pre-trial conferences have become standard practice and, al-
220. See REPORT OF THE HONORABLE ALFRED L. LUONGO, supra note 147.
221. See State of the Circuit Address by the Honorable Collins J. Seitz, Chief Judge,
Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit (Sept. 10, 1982), reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 71, 71
(1982).
222. Letter from Griffin Bell to Paul Nejelski (Oct. 19, 1982).
[VOL. 42
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
though useful, give no indication of providing further relief. Further-
more, a judge's heavy pre-trial involvement in civil litigation may not
accomplish the goal of judicial efficiency and may threaten a judge's
impartiality at trial.22 3 Fiscal and other practical obstacles, such as di-
minishing returns, impede limitless expansion of the judiciary. And
the number and power of magistrates seem presently to be at optimal
levels. Finally, in view of the current political climate, abolition of di-
versity jurisdiction seems remote.
Court-annexed arbitration is the most effective of the current
court-reform proposals. It expands the concept of pre-hearing confer-
ences to provide a mechanism for dispute termination. Court-annexed
arbitration is an excellent means of achieving the benefits of case man-
agement without the burden of the loss of judicial impartiality. Fur-
ther, court-annexed arbitration allows more matters to be terminated in
the same number of judge hours, and it removes a significant propor-
tion of diversity cases from the federal civil caseload.
To realize these benefits on a national level, and thus to provide
meaningful relief to the federal judicial system, Congress and the judi-
ciary must cooperate to create a national program of court-annexed
arbitration. Expanded experimentation would aid significantly the
problems traditionally associated with adjudication: delay, expense,
and an overburdened judiciary.
223. "Proponents of managerial judging ... claim that case management decreases de-
lay, produces more dispositions, and reduces litigation costs. But close examination of the
currently available information reveals little support for the conclusion that management is
responsible for efficiency gains (if any) at the district court level... " Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 417 (1982) (citation omitted). In fact, extensive involvement
in pre-trial matters may threaten the impartiality of the judge when he sits and hears the
case at trial. Id at 426-31.
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF ELIGIBLE CASES TERMINATED IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 2/1/78 TO 1/31/83
Manner in which
eligible cases were
terminated
Settled
Dismissed and othera
Judgment on award of
arbitrators
Terminated by trial de
novo
Total Cases Terminated
Cases
terminated
prior to
order of
referral to
arbitration
Cases
terminated
after order
of referral
to
arbitration
Total of all
eligible cases
terminated in
E.D. Pa.
(2/1/78-
1/31/83)
913 22.4% 836 20.5% 1749 43.O%
1680 41.3% 235 5.9% 1915 47.1%
0 - 330 8.1% 330 8.1%
0 - 72 1.8% 72 1.80/
2593 63.7% 1473 36.2% 4066 100.0%
Source: Office of E.D. of Pa. Clerk of Courts, unpublished report, Table II, at 16.
Note: During the first five years of the arbitration program, 25,547 civil cases were filed, of
which 4737 were eligible for arbitration. 4066 or 86% of the eligible cases were ter-
minated as of 1/31/83. In over two-thirds of the non-terminated cases (428), an
answer had not been filed, service of process had yet to be made, or the 120-day
discovery period had not elapsed.
a. There were 977 cases terminated by dismissal or judgment by the court, 266 dis-
missed by stipulation, 172 voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff, 186 terminated by default judg-
ment, and 130 transferred or remanded to state court.
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TABLE II
TOTAL CIVIL ACTION CASES FILED IN EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 2/1/78 TO 1/1/83
25,247 Total Cases25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000.
5,000
Source: Clerk's Report, 2/4/83
Ineligible Cases
Unterminated Eligible Cases 4,737 Eligible Cases
Terminated Eligible Cases )
20,510
671
4,066
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TABLE III
STATUS OF 671 UNTERMINATED, ELIGIBLE CASES
671
71(10.6%)
600 23 (3.4%)
215 (32.2%)
400
16 (2.4%)
2AA 58 (8.6%)
200 -
100 -
78 (11.6%)
122 (18.1%)
Trial de novo pending
Awaiting expiration of 20-day time period
for filing an appeal for trial de novo or
entry of judgment
Scheduled for hearing
Transferred to the suspense docket
Motions pending
120-day discovery period not yet expired
Answer not yet fied
Service of process not yet made
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88 (13.1%)
